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Abstract: 
 
Drawing on first-hand data collected from a household survey in urban Benin, we examine 
membership in two types of informal groups that display the characteristics of a commitment device: 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (roscas) and funeral groups. We investigate whether agents 
displaying time preferences with a present bias are more likely to commit themselves through 
participation in such groups. Our results provide evidence indicating that women who display such 
preferences are more likely to join funeral groups, but not roscas, and to save more through them. 
These results hold for women but not for men. We also ensure that our results cannot be explained by 
intrahousehold conflict issues. 
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1. Introduction 
With microcredit often proposed as an important tool for the fight against poverty in developing 
countries (see for example Morduch and Armendariz de Aghion 2005), one could be forgiven for 
overlooking the fact that often what the poor actually desire is the ability to save money. 
Consequently, their best interests might be served by merely providing access to affordable and 
reliable savings devices (Rutherford, 2000; Banerjee and Duflo, 2006). As such, understanding the 
means through which the poor manage to save and the motivations for doing so can have important 
policy implications; the more we know about why and how they save, the better that finance 
institutions can provide for their needs. Recent studies (for example Ashraf et al., 2006) based on 
evidence collected in developing economies have used insights from behavioural economics to 
emphasise the role played by self-control problems in undermining individuals' efforts to save, a 
problem that is often exacerbated by a lack of available and appropriate saving devices (Dupas and 
Robinson, 2013).  
 
Behavioural explanations of time preferences are at the centre of increasing interest in both the 
theoretical and empirical literature. Individuals with preferences which have a present bias will have a 
tendency to over-value immediate rewards at the expense of one’s long-term intentions. Someone with 
a present bias will thus give stronger weight to payoffs that are closer to the present time when 
considering trade-offs between two future moments (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Such preferences 
have been proposed as an explanation for poverty traps (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010), low 
technology adoption in the fields of agriculture (Duflo et al. 2011), demand for saving commitment 
devices (Ashraf et al., 2006; Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher, 2012) and microcredit (Bauer et al. 2012).  
 
This paper complements the literature by providing original evidence that agents who are present-
biased are more likely to save their money through informal commitment devices such as roscas 
(rotating savings and credit association) or funeral groups. We use the term informal in the sense that 
they take place outside of the market-place and are made without any legal arrangement that could in 
any way be binding. As is commonly defined, a commitment device restricts an individual’s own set of 
choices in the future, often as a means of controlling future impulsive behavior and limiting choices to 
those that reflect long-term goals (i.e. durable goods that require lumpy expenditures, etc.). 
 
To our knowledge the literature has not yet shown empirically a direct link between elicited present-
bias preferences and informal group membership. In the context of our study (where no use of 
randomized experiments is made), these members are mainly poor individuals who have little or no 
access to formal savings and credit offered by banks, or other microfinance institutions. This is often 
due to high transaction costs. As an example, a small survey of Beninese banks showed that conditions 
for opening an account in any public or private banks of Cotonou - such as fixed guarantee deposit, 
possession of an identity card (the costs of which are prohibitive) and literacy skills for the 
understanding of contracts - all act as strong deterrents against poor people. 
 
We use the results of a unique household survey to study the time preferences of 788 randomly 
selected individuals in two urban districts of Cotonou, Benin. Employing an elicitation strategy akin to 
Ashraf et al. (2006), which we explain in detail below, we find that 17% of individuals in our sample 
are present-biased or in our context also descripted as ‘hyperbolic’. A hyperbolic individual has 
preferences which discount the value of rewards in the future at a factor that increases with the length 
of the delay. So, when considering trade-offs between two future moments, such preferences give 
stronger relative weight to the earlier moment as it gets closer. An example of that would be when 
faced with the question: Would you prefer £1,000 now or £1,100 in a week? Hyperbolic agents would 
choose £1,000 now and not wait an extra week. But when faced with: Would you prefer £1,000 in a 
year’s time or £1,100 in a year and one week? The same individuals would choose £1,100 and be 
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willing to wait an extra week. In other words, in the short term trade-off (0/1 week), they are impatient 
for money now. But, in the future trade-off (52/53 weeks), they are willing to wait. 
 
Our results relate present-biased preferences and participation in roscas and in funeral groups and 
contributions made to such groups. They are indicative of correlations and not of causal relationships. 
We find evidence that hyperbolic women are more likely to join funeral groups and to make larger 
contributions to, and save a larger share of their savings in funeral groups. These results do not hold 
for roscas. Similar to Ashraf et al. (2006) and Bauer et al. (2012) the results only hold for women. We 
also show that the results cannot be explained by a potential intra-household conflict in preferences, as 
proposed by Anderson and Baland (2002). In such context, men and women, sharing a common budget, 
exhibit asymmetric preferences for household goods. Those asymmetries lead to intra-household 
conflicts: women have always a larger preference for the public good and therefore want to save at a 
higher rate than men. In such cases, a female would join a rosca in order to hide or secure their savings 
from their husband who would rather opt for present consumption. We document that for Beninese 
spouses the decisions of whether to join and how much to contribute to either commitment device are 
individual. This, along with other econometric results enable us to discard the intra-household 
commitment motive and to put forward the self-control commitment rationale. 
 
If agents have present-biased preferences, then it is likely that they will prefer to limit the set of 
options available to them. This rationale was proposed for informal groups, but not formally tested, by 
Gugerty (2007) and Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher (2012). They show that in the absence of 
alternative commitment saving strategies, those who have such preferences would turn to roscas. In 
our context, this same rationale is also applicable to funeral groups. The functioning of both groups 
and the features that make their design akin to commitment devices are outlined below.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the informal groups. Section 
three describes the Beninese intra-household context. The following section presents our data. Section 
five introduces our testable hypotheses and discusses our empirical estimates. Section six concludes.  
 
2. Informal groups and commitment 
 
Roscas 
 
Roscas: A rosca consists of a group of individuals who gather on a regular basis for a cycle of 
meetings, at which members contribute a fixed amount of money to a common pot. This is 
subsequently allocated to one member, who is then excluded from the reception of the collective 
savings in subsequent meetings. However, he or she is still obliged to contribute to the pot for the 
remainder of the cycle. Each cycle ends once every member has received the pot once. The rosca may 
then begin another cycle or decide to disband. Groups differ widely in terms of the number of 
members, size of contributions and the frequency of meetings. In our Beninese context, groups meet 
on a regular basis with compulsory meetings. The pot can be allocated either according to a random 
process (random roscas), through a decision imposed by the governing body of the group (decision 
roscas) or through a bidding process. We observed only decision and random roscas.  
 
Roscas do not offer interest on savings and participation therein implies costs (transport, time, etc.); 
members also face the risk of default from others, thus raising the issue of enforcement. Furthermore, 
the savings rate in a rosca is likely to differ from each member’s optimal rate; participants therefore 
experience less flexibility than if they were to save on their own. Yet despite these costs, roscas are 
relatively popular in several developing regions.  
 
   
 4 
 
Rosca as a commitment device : A significant motive discussed in the literature for membership is that 
roscas seem able to respond to the need for commitment against one’s present biased preferences. In 
the absence of alternative commitment savings strategies, individuals that have such problems may 
turn to roscas; they would otherwise indefinitely renegotiate with themselves if trying to save on their 
own. Individuals may therefore join a rosca in order to bind themselves and in doing so limit the set of 
available options by securing part of their revenues against everyday temptations (Gugerty, 2007; 
Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher, 2012). 
 
Based on a dataset collected in 2004 in Cotonou, Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher (2012) show that rosca 
members spend on average less on ‘temptation goods’ (alcohol, fizzy drinks, sweets, cigarettes, meals 
out and entertainment) than non-members, implying that the groups do indeed help agents to discipline 
themselves to save. Their findings are from an indirect test of the hypothesis of commitment against 
self-control problems using matching estimates of the average effect of rosca participation. The 
authors did not however elicit a measure of time discounting and thus could not formally test the 
hypothesis according to which hyperbolic discounters are more likely to join roscas. Using the follow-
up longitudinal survey completed in 2006, in which a time discounting measure was elicited, we 
complement their work by formally obtaining correlations with present-bias and memberships in 
commitment devices.  
 
Through direct questions addressed to the 116 members (out of 788) of our 2006 sample who belonged 
to a rosca, we have empirical evidence suggesting the need for a commitment device as a motive for 
membership. ‘Discipline’ or ‘the willingness to force savings’ were by far the most popular answers, 
implying that a vast majority of members use the rosca as a means to commit themselves to save. 
Indeed 73% of rosca members (85 out of 116) stated that they joined in order to discipline themselves 
into saving (only 7% mentioned ‘buying a durable good’).  
 
Additional evidence supporting commitment as a motive for joining roscas lies with the fact that 55% 
of members (64 out of 116 members) preferred to receive the pot at the end of a cycle. This preference 
is not correlated to the duration of group membership and is therefore unlikely to be related to any 
learning effect. Of those who preferred being at the end of the cycle, 78% (50 out of 64) said it was 
because they did not want to feel indebted towards the group. They considered receiving the pot in the 
early stages of a cycle as a debt towards the group to be repaid by future contributions, a situation that 
they would prefer to avoid (this answer was provided unprompted). Such debt aversion largely 
confirms the incentive and disciplining role of the group, exerted through peer pressure towards a 
defaulting member. Moreover, leaving a rosca prematurely can be costly in case of default and 
sanctions are more severe towards a member who defaults after having received the pot. Many 
members told us in informal interviews that, aside from minimizing the threat of sanctions, receiving 
the pot at the end of a cycle provides in itself additional motivation to make payments and successfully 
complete a cycle. The threat - and credibility of - sanctions are not only important factors influencing 
preferences on the timing of pot reception, but also key elements that make roscas good commitment 
devices.  
 
Funeral Groups 
 
Funeral groups: Discussions in the literature about funeral groups are scarce. Roth (1999) offers some 
evidence concerning such groups in South Africa, Dercon et al. (2006) for Ethiopia and Tanzania, and 
LeMay-Boucher (2009) considers their existence in Benin. Whilst funeral groups vary across regions 
in both their form and function to a greater extent than roscas, some common traits define them. 
Members typically gather on a regular basis and during a meeting those who have suffered an adverse 
shock can put in a claim to the group for an indemnity, according to the nature of the shock. The rules 
of each group specify a list of shocks eligible for insurance as well as the corresponding amount of the 
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indemnity offered. Before allocating an indemnity, groups usually perform checks on claims. A 
recipient’s indemnity is thus the sum of members’ individual contributions. These contributions are 
made up of regular premiums paid by each member (usually weekly). The large majority of groups 
require such premiums (whereas a minority require on-the-spot payment). Variation is observed in 
traits such as the number of members, frequency of meetings, list of shocks for which indemnity is 
offered, terms of payment and in operating modes. 
 
Funeral groups as a commitment device: In Benin these groups offer insurance to members by 
providing indemnities for a wide range of shocks, including for funeral expenses. For a more detailed 
description of these groups see LeMay-Boucher (2012). In the local dialect, these groups are called 
‘nuje me ji gbe’, a direct translation of which is ‘happiness-unhappiness funds’. ‘Happy’ events, which 
are covered by the vast majority of groups, include the costs linked to a ceremony for celebrating a 
birth, baptism, marriage, diploma or anniversary and ‘unhappy’ events comprise death or illness (both 
of members and member their relatives), loss of job, and destruction of professional or household 
belongings.  
 
There are two key features that differentiate Beninese funeral groups from the strict definition of an 
insurance group. Firstly, ‘premiums’ paid by one individual in a funeral group are accumulated and 
kept until a pay-out is required from the group. As such this differs from the usual definition of a 
premium, which represents an amount of money charged by (for example) an insurance group or a 
company for active coverage. If no claim is made during a period, the premiums are lost. Furthermore, 
provided that premiums are paid, such insurance groups or companies will permit an unlimited number 
of pay outs for every valid claim that has been introduced, irrespective of timing. However in order to 
equilibrate the total amount of payments allocated between members, indemnities are usually allocated 
cyclically. About three groups in every four limit the number of indemnities that can be received by 
any one member (this number is identical for all members). Once a member has reached the ceiling she 
must wait until all other members have also received this number of indemnities to be eligible for 
further assistance. As such, cycles have no fixed duration in time. The typical ceiling that we observed 
was between two and four indemnities for a combination of ‘happy’ or ‘unhappy’ events. These 
limitations can be viewed as a mechanism to provide some sort of balanced reciprocity (see Platteau, 
1997), guaranteeing each member a certain degree of equivalence between what is paid in and what is 
received in indemnities. This process continues until all members have received a fixed number of 
indemnities, thereby completing a whole cycle. Groups may then decide to discontinue or to begin 
another cycle (none of the groups surveyed stopped their activities after a pre-determined number of 
cycles).  
 
What is key is that the aforementioned ‘happy’ events are all anticipatable, whereas only some 
‘unhappy’ are, to a limited extent. Membership can therefore be perceived as a means to save in 
advance or to commit money for such occurrences. Regular contributions to a group present an 
opportunity to render savings illiquid towards those foreseeable expenditures. Given their mode of 
operation, the regularity of premiums paid and the strict accounting performed by members on both the 
premiums and indemnities allocated (so that what goes in and out of the cashbox is carefully registered 
at the individual level), funeral groups display the basic features of a commitment device.  
 
The vast majority of the 114 members of our dataset stated that the main motive for joining a funeral 
group was to 'save and get indemnity in case of need'. Whilst this clearly underlines the need for 
insurance, it can also be interpreted as a need for a commitment device in order to put money aside for 
future occurrences that will require substantial financial contributions. In terms of enforcement 
mechanisms, leaving a group before the end of a cycle leads to sanctions comparable to the ones 
imposed by roscas. 
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Out of the 788 individuals that were surveyed, 42% made payments related to funerals and/or illness 
during last six months, spending on average 2000 FCFA and 1000 FCFA per month respectively 
(averages made over the last six months). Average monthly income over the same period was 46000 
FCFA (median 33000 FCFA), this represents USD 90 at the time of the survey (USD 1 is 
approximately 500 FCFA). These two expenses together represent 6.5% of monthly income. Such 
figures show partially the importance of the expenditures for which funeral groups cater for. Our data 
also show total expenses for a funeral ceremony can easily amount 6 to 10 times one’s monthly 
income. In Roth (1999) it is said that the poor in South Africa spend approximately 15 times their 
average monthly income on funerals. 
 
The operation of roscas differs from that of informal insurance groups. In roscas, the timing of the 
reception of the pot is not based on insurance needs whereas in insurance groups, indemnities are 
offered only in case of a precise adverse shock. Roscas allocate the pot to members in rotation but this 
is not the case for benefits (or payouts) in insurance groups, where one member can make successive 
claims. Furthermore, the time duration of a cycle is fixed in roscas but not specified in insurance 
groups. A large proportion of premiums imposed by insurance groups are small, and larger 
contributions are expected upon request. Thus, contrary to roscas, the periodicity of important 
payments is not known in the majority of groups. 
 
3. Intrahousehold decision process 
 
A large proportion of men and women with whom we spoke during our pilot survey declared that their 
spouse was unaware of the course of their occupational activities and was therefore unable to guess 
their income. Many (irrespective of age or gender) stated ‘the less he/she knows about my activities, 
the better it is’ or ‘I don’t want him/her to know my income otherwise he/she will ask me to meet the 
cost of such and such expenses.’ Spouses were overwhelmingly secretive, indeed it even seemed quite 
natural to divulge as little information as possible to one’s partner. As a result, spouses rarely ask 
questions concerning their partner’s income or inquire about their activities. It is a kind of tacit 
convention allowing each member of the couple to keep their income more or less secret. Questions 
related to these observations were addressed to the 381 respondents aged older than 18 and in a couple. 
To the question ‘Can you estimate your spouse’s revenues?’ 86% answered no, 4% yes and 9% 
partially. Results were similar for ‘Do you think your spouse knows your revenues?’ where 83% 
answered no, 5% yes and 11% partially. This indicates that couples can be considered as business 
arrangements between partners who desire the household needs in terms of public goods to be 
provided for. 
 
The result of such practice is that each individual has a lot of leverage in managing his or her personal 
income. Thus by acting in a secretive way, spouses avoid sharing their personal earnings or 
contributing to a common budget and retain the sole control over their personal expenditures. Being 
aware of this particular feature, we designed our survey to account for the fact that the household is a 
collection of separate economic spheres. We therefore surveyed each husband, wife or other adult 
member of a household in isolation, giving us data at the individual level on group membership, 
contributions, income, etc. Falen (2011) and LeMay-Boucher and Dagnelie (2014) substantiate this 
dichotomy between the husband and wife’s finances within a couple. They also document that social 
norms play an important role in determining the intra-household allocation of expenses by gender in 
Benin. 
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4. Data 
 
Our unique, first-hand dataset was collected in 2006 in the districts of Vossa and Enagnon located in 
Cotonou, Benin (a city of about 1.1 million inhabitants). They are known to the city’s authority as the 
poorest districts. Both districts are near to downtown Cotonou, where a large proportion of their 
inhabitants commute every day for work. No formal savings and investment institutions such as banks 
and NGOs were present in these districts at the time of our survey. Selection of our 386 households 
was done according to a random process (our survey methodology is described in Elven and LeMay-
Boucher, 2016). For maximal accuracy, all members of each household were interviewed separately so 
that delicate issues related to expenses or income were tackled in private. Particular attention was thus 
placed on confidentiality. We are left with a total sample of 788 individuals aged eighteen or older.  
   
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the overall sample. 54% of respondents are female and the 
mean age is 36.7 years. Half of those surveyed live in a couple and the average household comprises 5 
members. The level of schooling is identified through a dummy variable which is equal to one if the 
individual has attended at least secondary school and zero otherwise. Average monthly individual 
income is around 46000 FCFA. Each individual’s monthly income is the sum of all income-generating 
activities; i.e. work in the formal and informal sector, self-employed activities, earnings from interest 
on loans made, rents from property owned and transfers received. 62% of all respondents claimed to 
have been employed in their current job for at last two years. 15% and 14% of respondents declared to 
be members of roscas and funeral groups, with an average monthly contribution of about 1600 and 300 
FCFA respectively.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Eliciting Time Discounting 
 
We measured time preferences by asking agents to choose between accepting a small reward soon or a 
larger reward with some delay. We complement this by asking a similar question involving similar 
rewards and delays, but shifted forward in the future. We refer to the first question as the ‘short-term 
frame’: 'Which option would you prefer: 2000 FCAF in 1 week or 3000 FCAF in five weeks?' and the 
second question as the ‘long-term frame’: 'Which option would you prefer: 2000 FCFA in one year or 
3000 FCFA in 13 months?'. This framework allows us to identify the presence of time preference 
reversal and represents a simplified version of the one used in Ashraf et al. (2006). 2000 and 3000 
FCFA represent an average income for three and four and a half days of work respectively. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the group of individuals who prefer to receive money earlier in both frames, 
(‘Always Impatient’), represents 26.78% of the overall sample. Those who prefer to receive money 
later in both time frames (50.63%) are labelled ‘Always Patient’. People displaying time preference 
reversal represent roughly a quarter of the sample (22.6%). We define those preferring the immediate 
amount in the short-term frame and the larger reward in the long-term frame as hyperbolic; they 
constitute 17.13% of our sample. There is also a small group of ‘future biased’ individuals i.e. 5.4%, 
whose preferences correspond to patience in the short term and impatience in the long-term frame. 
Their behaviour could be rationalized by considering an individual not constrained by liquidity in the 
short run but who foresees a shock in the future, although given the small number of agents in this 
group we cannot rule out the possibility that the survey question was misunderstood. If we look at 
comparable categories, namely a one-month discount rate of 50%, our shares for different time 
preferences across surveyed individuals do not differ considerably from what others who employed 
slightly different elicitation techniques have found (see Bauer et al., 2012; Ashraf et al., 2006). As in 
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these two papers, our methodology does not involve the use of real payments, relying solely on 
hypothetical questions. Our elicitation strategy allows us to reduce the effect of seasonality on time 
preferences, as the future choice is shifted forward by exactly one year. In the short-term frame, we 
avoided proposing a choice between a certain amount today and a higher one a week from now. 
Instead, the choice offered was between one week and five weeks. In the sense that no reward is ever 
obtained without some minimal delay, allowing us to compare two choices and to avoid a possible bias 
toward the present immediate option. In order to limit the importance of framing in time preference 
elicitation, the two questions were asked in separate sections of the questionnaire. In this literature, the 
elicitation of time discounting is done independently from the notion of risk and so our analysis is not 
done in parallel with any elicitation of risk preferences. The idea behind this simple design was to 
obtain a measure comparable to other published papers in this literature. However, by using a 
relatively crude measure, our survey is likely to miss out on some individuals. Using a richer measure, 
with several time horizons and rewards offered, might yield a more convincing analysis. Thus, 
responses elicited to our time preference questions cannot be unambiguously viewed as revealing the 
respondents’ true preferences. The narrowness of our measure of time preferences thus requires us to 
emphasise that we need to interpret the results presented below with a degree of caution.  
 
5. Results and discussion 
 
Determinants of time preferences 
In table 3 we analyse the determinants of the three main time preference patterns: always patient, 
always impatient and present biased. From column 7, we find that male are more likely to be 
hyperbolic. Apart from gender and being in couple, being hyperbolic does not appear to be driven by 
demographic or socio-economic characteristics such as income, employment status, age, level of 
education, total expenditure and saving. Hyperbolic agents represent only 10% of rosca members (14 
out of 116). No significant differences are uncovered when comparing hyperbolic and non-hyperbolic 
rosca members with respect to both individual (age, in a couple, income etc.) and group characteristics 
(contribution, random vs. decision order), reasons for membership and preference over the timing of 
pot reception (beginning vs. the end of the cycle). A similar lack of significant differences is found 
with regards to funeral group membership. 
 
In table 3, we also find that females are more likely to be patient than males. Males in a couple are 
more patient than single men. We find that job stability (a dummy equal to one if the respondent 
declared to have kept their current job for at last two years) is negatively related to a preference for 
patience. Geographical location appears to matter: those living in the neighbourhood of Vossa are 
more patient for a reason (independent of the enumerator used) that escapes us. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Patience is also increasing (at a decreasing rate and only mildly, at the 10% level) in income and 
negatively correlated with household size. Tanaka et al. (2010) also find that richer individuals are 
more patient. However, income is not significantly correlated with being hyperbolic, nor with 
impatience. Furthermore, if we consider the likelihood of being hyperbolic across our various income 
quintiles we do not find any significant differences (see online Appendix A for a table of results 
related to this). This suggests that the proportion of hyperbolic individuals is not significantly different 
between the poorest, richest and other quintiles of income. From these various results we cannot 
conclude that richer individuals (either female, male or both combined) exhibit less present bias; it 
appears from our sample that being hyperbolic does not seem to be correlated with income.1 This 
                                                          
1 In addition to monthly income, we also use monthly income net of monthly contributions to roscas and funeral groups 
combined. With identical specifications as in Table 3 we find similar results: income net of group monthly contributions is 
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shows that, in our context, individuals exhibiting an apparent present bias are unlikely to do so because 
they face liquidity constraints now which they expect to be eased in the future. 
 
Hyperbolic discounting, membership and contribution 
 
We test two hypotheses which are conditional on individuals displaying hyperbolic preferences.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Hyperbolic agents are more likely to commit to save by joining a rosca or funeral 
group. 
  
We use a linear probability model in order to test our first conjecture by looking at the relationship 
between hyperbolic preferences and the likelihood of being a member of roscas and funeral groups, 
whilst controlling for other covariates. Our model is expressed as: 
 
Yi = β0 + β1 hyperbolici + β2 always patienti + β3 Xi + εi 
 
where Yi is a dummy variable equal to one if individual i is a member of either a rosca, funeral group 
or both in 2006. hyperbolic is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent displays hyperbolic 
preferences (i.e. is impatient in the short-term frame and patient in the long-term frame). Xi represents 
a vector of relevant controls (education, age, income, etc.). We also use dummies for neighbourhood 
fixed effects and εi represents the error term.
2 We believe that in the context of our study the two urban 
neighbourhoods of Vossa and Enagnon offer a similar density of roscas that hold meetings within 
walking distance. We also include always patient. Future-biased, one of our four time preference 
categories, represents only 5.4% of the overall sample and is thus merged with the category always 
impatient as the benchmark. Our results are similar if we exchange always patient for always impatient 
in the specification above. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 4 displays the results for the overall sample, for which we use robust standard errors. 
Our results are indicative of correlations and not of causal relationships. We show participation in both 
commitment devices separately and combined. Our results on the coefficient for hyperbolic clearly 
reject hypothesis 1. We also test the hypothesis that the sum of coefficients attached to hyperbolic, 
female*hyperbolic and female is equal to zero (denoted as 'Hyp a' in the table). This hypothesis is 
rejected (at the 10% level) for funeral groups but not for roscas alone. When we combine both 
memberships, we get a borderline p-value of 0.104 in model 5 and a clear rejection in model 6. These 
results indicate that hyperbolic women appear more likely to be involved in one of the saving 
commitment devices (funeral groups) compared to men. Our results also hold if we use a probit model 
or bivariate probit model. We find similar interaction effects in our models if we estimate them 
following the procedure suggested by Norton et al. (2004). 
 
Our results are indicative of a positive correlation between hyperbolic preferences and the use of 
funeral groups for females. Results are also suggestive of gender differences in dealing with self-
control problems. Hyperbolic males make less frequent use of roscas and funeral groups. One reason 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
only significant for the ‘always patient’ category and not for the ‘always impatient’ and ‘hyperbolic’. This seems to show 
that people who join informal groups and thus may be liquidity constrained precisely because they have money locked up 
in these groups, are not more likely to appear hyperbolic in the responses to cash trade-off questions. 
2 Our regressions are likely to suffer from omitted variable bias due to some unobserved heterogeneity. While there may be 
more, we can think of the following two: ‘preferences for saving devices’ and ‘number of groups available to a given 
member’ which are not directly measured. Whilst aware of this issue of identification, we are not able to provide a 
correction for this endogeneity problem. Thus, this represents a limitation in interpreting our results. 
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that could explain this is that they may be less aware of their preferences. We offer additional reasons 
below. Results on the other covariates show that rosca and funeral group participation is quadratic in 
income and the maximum is reached at very high levels (above the 90th income percentile). Specifying 
income in logs does not alter this result and the positive relationship is confirmed. Income stability (i.e. 
whether someone has held her/his current job for at least 24 months) is not significantly related to 
membership in any group. The results are robust to the introduction of dummy variables for rosca or 
funeral group membership in 20043, which are always significantly and positively correlated with 
participation in 2006. Our results are also robust when we add a second interaction term, always 
patient*female. Moreover, our results are on the whole similar if we include always patient and always 
patient*female or always impatient and always impatient*female in the specification. 
 
We can offer two additional reasons as to why hyperbolic women are more likely to use a commitment 
device while hyperbolic men are not. It may be partially coming from their greater willingness to 
invest in the public good of the household and thus have a more long term view than their partner or 
other single males. LeMay-Boucher and Dagnelie (2014) use a similar Beninese sample to ours and 
show that women spend a larger share of their income budget than men on goods that are more likely 
to benefit the household and less on private goods such as meals out, alcohol and cigarettes 
(temptation goods). It may also be that women experience greater difficulty saving. This is one of the 
reasons proposed by Bauer et al (2012) in their study based on Indian data, which highlights that 
present-biased women are more likely to borrow from MFIs. This could also partially apply in our 
context. Women who find it harder to save may be more tempted to opt for a commitment device than 
present-biased males.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Hyperbolic agents are expected to contribute more to a saving commitment device.  
 
We investigate the relationship between the level of saving in commitment devices and time 
preferences using a Tobit model. This estimation strategy is necessary due to high censoring levels in 
the dependent variable (77.5%). As in the previous section, we consider contributions to roscas and 
funeral groups alone and combined. Our results on to the coefficient for hyperbolic, in Panel B of table 
4, clearly reject hypothesis 2. However, our estimates show a positive correlation between being a 
hyperbolic female and the level of contributions in funeral group and funeral group and/or rosca 
combined, but not for rosca alone. That is to say, we reject the null that the sum of the coefficients of 
hyperbolic, female and female*hyperbolic are equal to zero at the 10% in columns 3, 4 and 6 (denoted 
as 'Hyp a' in the table). Former participation is positively related to the level of contributions. Income 
has a positive and concave relationship with the level of contributions. 
 
We repeat this exercise, expressing contributions as a share of total savings. Total savings is defined as 
the sum of money invested in four different savings vehicles, namely itinerant bankers, funeral groups, 
roscas and formal savings accounts (banks, post offices etc.)4. Results (not shown) using a Tobit model 
(or OLS for the subsample of non-zero contributions) indicate a positive correlation between being 
hyperbolic for women and the share of saving in commitment devices. These results indicate that, for 
females, being hyperbolic leads to putting a larger share of their savings into commitment device.  
                                                          
3 Data from 2006 represents the second wave of a longitudinal data collection process which was initiated in 2004. A 
section on eliciting time preferences was added to the follow-up in 2006. Given the availability of variables on time 
preferences, our paper is based on the cross-sectional information contained in the 2006 survey. Some information from the 
2004 survey is used.  
4 Both formal savings accounts and itinerant bankers do not strictly require a member to follow a fixed schedule of 
contributions and as such there is no penalty for not abiding. Moreover, these two devices do not offer peer pressure, which 
is central to the design of both funeral groups and roscas. Because our current focus is on commitment devices we do not 
bundle use of a formal savings account and itinerant banker with roscas and funeral groups in the dependent variable of our 
empirical analysis.  
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The decision to join a group and the amount contributed are not likely to be independent. Since 
participation in a group is self-selected, the observations taken into account in the structural equation 
are not drawn from a random sample. As such, we suspect that unobserved heterogeneity influences 
both the likelihood of joining and the size of contributions. It is therefore necessary to tackle the 
problem of selection bias that leads to potentially inconsistent estimates induced by the correlation 
between the error term and the regressors. To deal with this problem, we use a sample-selection model 
(Heckman two-step estimation), which allows for possible dependence between the selection 
(participation to groups in 2006) and structural equations (contributions to those groups). The 
exclusion restrictions we implement in the structural equation involve ethnic affiliations. Whilst ethnic 
affiliation is a determinant of group participation, it does not relate significantly to the level of 
contributions. Furthermore we observe no systematic differences in many economic variables across 
ethnic groups. Results from the Heckman two-step procedure (shown in Appendix B available online) 
confirm some of our previous conclusions. They show a positive correlation between being a 
hyperbolic female and being a member of a funeral group, and funeral group and /or rosca combined, 
but not for roscas alone.  However, they only show a very mild link between being a hyperbolic female 
and the level of contributions in a funeral group and/or rosca combined, but not for roscas or funeral 
groups alone. This can be seen in model 6, for which we are on the threshold of rejecting hypothesis a 
(with a p-value of 0.109). 
 
Additional Motives for Membership  
 
The use of roscas or funeral groups as a tool for self-discipline is not the only motive given in the 
literature for participation. Anderson and Baland (2002) propose the need for a commitment device 
against intra-household allocation problems. Wives who have greater preferences for an indivisible 
good will want to save more than husbands. In the case of such conflict between partners, a wife can 
use a rosca as a way to avoid claims by her husband for immediate consumption and protect her 
savings. However, as shown in Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher (2012), who employ data from 2004 in a 
similar context to ours, this motive seems unfit for our Beninese setting. Our probit regressions results 
confirm that this motive is not relevant to the Beninese context; the share of female income (expressed 
as a percentage of spouses' total income, and its square), which is suggested by Anderson and Baland 
(2002) as a proxy for the women’s weight in household decision-making, is not significant in 
explaining membership in both groups (results not shown). Results also show that the coefficients for 
the variables 'female' and 'female*couple' are not significant, individually and jointly. This suggests 
that neither gender nor being part of a couple holds any explanatory power over rosca and funeral 
group participation. These variables remain insignificant in our estimates of the monthly contributions 
for the sub-sample of members in a couple.  
 
A significant proportion of members we interviewed declared that it was impossible to save money if 
they were to leave it at home. Savings would quickly evaporate due to all sorts of social pressures and 
demands coming from family, friends, neighbours and the spouse. By joining for a rosca or a funeral 
group, one opts for a socially accepted alibi to protect one’s savings against all types of social 
pressures (Brune et al., 2011, finds such evidence amongst Malawian farmers). In our sample, 22% 
and 1% of members mentioned that they joined a rosca or funeral group respectively to protect their 
savings. It can thus mean two things which cannot be discriminated: 1) protection against potential 
income sharing and pressure from relatives and 2) protection against the risks of theft, fire or other 
catastrophes that were mentioned during informal interviews.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
Where formal institutions are unavailable, arrangements such as roscas or funeral groups provide the 
poor with an affordable and reliable means to save or freeze money for future use. Whilst a range of 
motives for participation in such groups have been discussed in the literature, first hand evidence from 
a household survey in Benin shows that individuals might actually do so as a result of self-control 
problems. Having identified the portion of our sample displaying hyperbolic preferences, we are able 
to test two hypotheses with regards their willingness to commit to a group in order to foster self-
discipline. Results suggest that females displaying hyperbolic preferences are more likely to join such 
a group (in our case funeral groups but not roscas) and will contribute more on average. Males on the 
other hand seem less aware of their hyperbolic preferences and are as such less likely to join a group in 
order to save.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
              Mean se   
Age 36.72 0.51   
Secondary school or above 0.28 0.02   
Female 0.539 0.017  
Household size 5.02 0.10   
In couple 0.50 0.02   
Income 45.99 2.07   
House owner 0.80 0.01   
Same job for 24 months or more 0.62 0.02   
Salaried 0.14 0.01   
Rosca member 0.15 0.01   
Member of funeral group 0.14 0.01   
Ethnic group: Fon 0.21 0.01   
Ethnic group: Popo 0.31 0.02   
Ethnic group: Goun 0.36 0.02   
Ethnic group: Peul 0.05 0.01   
Location: Vossa 0.22 0.01   
Location: Enagnon 0.78 0.01   
Always patient 0.51 0.02   
Always impatient 0.27 0.02   
Hyperbolic 0.17 0.01   
Number of observations 788    
Note: All money amounts are monthly, individual and expressed in FCFA (000’s).  
Individuals younger than 18 years are excluded 
 
 
Table 2: Responses to time preference questions 
                                     
 
              
                          
 
                           
 
                           
 
                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
Figures in parentheses show statistics related to the female subsample of 425.  
Example: There are 100 females who are ‘Always Impatient’ so 23.5% of the 425.  
                                
 
a) 2000 FCFAs in 
a year 
b) 3000 FCFA in 
13 months 
Total 
a) 2000 FCFA in                                      
1 Week 211 (100) 
26.8% (23.5%) 
Always Impatient 
135 (64) 
17.1% (15.1%) 
Hyperbolic 
 
346 (164) 
44.9% (38.6%) 
Impatient short-term 
 
b) 3000 FCFA in 5 
weeks 
 
43 (22) 
5.4% (5.1%) 
Future-biased 
 
 
399 (239) 
50.6% (56.2%) 
Always Patient 
 
442 (261) 
55.1% (61.3%) 
Patient short-term 
Total 
254 (122) 
32.2% (28.7%) 
Impatient  long term 
534 (254) 
67.7 % (59.8%) 
Patient long term 
788 (425) 
100% 
Total 
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Table 3: Determinants of time preferences 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Always patient Always impatient Hyperbolic 
OLS results All Female Male All Female Male All Female Male 
                    
Female 0.20*** -0.09* -0.11*** 
(0.051) (0.046) (0.039) 
In couple 0.06 -0.13 0.17** -0.02 0.11 -0.10 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
(0.052) (0.105) (0.066) (0.047) (0.088) (0.062) (0.041) (0.095) (0.054) 
Female*In couple -0.08 0.09 0.02 -0.09 0.09* 0.06 
(0.066) (0.105) (0.059) (0.089) (0.051) (0.094) 
Income 0.00** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Income squared -0.00** -0.00 -0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age -0.00 0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Secondary school or above 0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 0.03 
(0.043) (0.064) (0.058) (0.039) (0.058) (0.052) (0.032) (0.046) (0.046) 
Same job for 24 months or more -0.11** -0.11* -0.14** 0.06 0.02 0.13* 0.02 0.03 0.01 
(0.044) (0.063) (0.069) (0.040) (0.053) (0.066) (0.034) (0.046) (0.057) 
Salaried 0.03 0.13 -0.02 0.02 -0.14** 0.09 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 
(0.053) (0.096) (0.063) (0.048) (0.064) (0.061) (0.039) (0.065) (0.049) 
House owner 0.07 0.03 0.13* -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 0.02 0.03 
(0.048) (0.067) (0.071) (0.045) (0.059) (0.070) (0.036) (0.046) (0.058) 
Household size -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.00 0.02** -0.01 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Location: Vossa 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.29*** -0.22*** -0.15*** -0.32*** -0.06* -0.09* -0.02 
(0.046) (0.059) (0.071) (0.037) (0.050) (0.057) (0.036) (0.045) (0.056) 
Constant 0.39*** 0.56*** 0.50*** 0.46*** 0.39*** 0.36** 0.11 -0.04 0.16 
(0.098) (0.131) (0.148) (0.093) (0.121) (0.144) (0.069) (0.068) (0.118) 
Observations 788 425 363 788 425 363 788 425 363 
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Ethnic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust se in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Individuals younger than 18 years are excluded; All models are controlled for ethnic 
affiliations. 
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Table 4: Determinants of participation in commitment devices 
PANEL A: OLS estimates for the use of commitment device in 2006 
Panel A: Membership (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS estimates Rosca Funeral group Rosca and/or Funeral group 
              
Hyperbolic -0.09** -0.08* -0.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 
(0.042) (0.040) (0.045) (0.037) (0.049) (0.042) 
Always patient 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.024) (0.033) (0.031) 
Female*Hyperbolic 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.13* 0.13* 
(0.062) (0.066) (0.067) (0.060) (0.074) (0.071) 
Female 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.06** 0.04 0.11*** 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.027) (0.028) (0.037) (0.038) 
Member of rosca in 2004 0.42*** 0.31*** 
(0.043) (0.046) 
Member of funeral group in 2004 0.53*** 0.36*** 
(0.042) (0.047) 
Constant 0.15* 0.07 -0.10 -0.13** 0.05 -0.02 
(0.086) (0.084) (0.071) (0.062) (0.094) (0.087) 
Observations 788 693 788 693 788 693 
R-squared 0.10 0.28 0.17 0.47 0.18 0.39 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hyp a (F-stat) 0.0081 0.63 3.10 6.88 2.66 7.24 
Hyp a (p-value) 0.93 0.43 0.079 0.0089 0.104 0.0073 
 
PANEL B: Tobit estimates for contribution to commitment devices in 2006 
 Panel B: contribution (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Tobit estimates Rosca Funeral group Rosca and/or Funeral groups  
Hyperbolic -14.10** -14.40*** -1.11 -1.19 -9.36*** -9.31*** 
(5.632) (5.094) (1.140) (1.257) (3.312) (3.074) 
Always patient 0.70 -1.49 -0.09 -0.58 0.99 -0.71 
(2.755) (2.751) (0.756) (0.881) (1.979) (1.923) 
Female*Hyperbolic 16.29* 17.62** 3.00** 3.51** 12.95** 14.14** 
(8.328) (8.288) (1.428) (1.574) (5.440) (5.628) 
Female 1.65 4.41 1.39 2.07** 3.50 5.90** 
(3.714) (3.869) (0.913) (0.950) (2.705) (2.839) 
Member of rosca in 2004 22.43*** 13.81*** 
(3.869) (2.360) 
Member of funeral group in 2004 5.43*** 8.44*** 
(0.813) (2.320) 
Constant -34.98*** -36.29*** -11.24*** -11.37*** -29.48*** -29.65*** 
(9.143) (9.465) (2.578) (2.982) (7.131) (7.199) 
Observations 788 693 788 693 788 693 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hyp a (F-stat) 0.38 1.26 7.29 10.68 2.23 4.18 
Hyp a (p-value) 0.54 0.26 0.0071 0.0011 0.14 0.041 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Individuals younger than 18 years are excluded.  
All regressions include the following set of controls: in couple, income, income square, age, secondary school or above,  
same job for 24 months or more, salaried,  house owner, Household size, ethnic group and location dummies.   
Hyp a: the sum of coefficients of hyperbolic, female and female*hyperbolic is equal to zero.  
For PANEL B: the dependent variables is expressed in FCFA (000’s). 
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